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In the Court of Appeals
State of Utah
BRIAN HIGH DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,

Co-Defendant and Appellant,
vs.
R.D.
Co-Defendant and Appellee.

Brief of Appellee
Comes now Appellee R.D., a Utah partnership, by and through its counsel,
Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom & Drake, a Utah professional corporation, and responds to
Appellant Brian High Development Corporation's brief on appeal.
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)Q) (1953, as amended), and Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)0)
(1953, as amended). This appeal was originally filed in the Utah Supreme Court and
was transferred to the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(4) (1953,
as amended).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Did the trial court err in finding no genuine issue as to any material fact and
therefore granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee as a matter of law?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing the granting of a motion for summary judgment, the court
inquires "whether there is any genuine issue as to any material fact, and if there is not,
whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Arrow Industries.
Inc. v. Zions First Nat'l Bank. 767 P.2d 935, 936 (Utah 1988). The court reviews "the

facts and inferences from those facts in the light most favorable to the losing party."
English v. Kienke. 774 P.2d 1154, 1156 (Utah App. 1989). "[T]he Court treats the
statements and evidentiary materials of the appellant as if a jury would receive them
as the only credible evidence and sustains a judgment... if no issues of fact which
could affect the outcome can be discerned." Arrow Industries. Inc. v. Zions First

National BanK, 767 p.2d at 937.
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is determinative in this action,
and it states in pertinent part:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellee R.D. ("R.D.") sold certain real property to Steve Sevy, as Trustee for
undisclosed beneficiaries. According to the purchase agreement, periodic payments
were to be made for purchase of the property and an escrow was established with
Security Title Company of Southern Utah ("Title Company"). Steve Sevy transferred
both the property and debt thereon to Appellant Brian High Development Corporation
("Brian High") before the full purchase price was paid. Subsequently, Brian High
defaulted on payments and R.D. demanded that the Title Company enforce the default
provisions of the purchase agreement and escrow. The Title Company refused and
began this action as an interpleader with a request for declaratory judgment. Brian
High and R.D. were joined as co-defendants. During the course of the litigation, the
Title Company entered into a settlement agreement with R.D., and the litigation
continued on R.D.'s cross-claim against Brian High. R.D. moved the court for summary
judgment against Brian High. On July 11,1990, and after several hearings on R.D.'s

Motion for Summary Judgment, summary judgment was entered against Brian High in
the Fifth District Court for Iron County, State of Utah, by District Court Judge J. Philip
Eves. Brian High has appealed from that judgment.
FACTS OF THE CASE
Identification of Persons Involved
The plaintiff in the action below was Security Title Company of Southern Utah
("Title Company"), which is a Utah corporation doing business as a title insurance
company and escrow agent in Iron County, State of Utah.
Appellee R.D. ("R.D.") is a Utah general partnership. Robert L Brayton
("Brayton") is a general partner in R.D.
Steve Sevy ("Sevy"), is an individual residing in Iron County, State of Utah, and
was a party to the property agreement as a Trustee for certain beneficiaries whose
complete identities are not presently known.
Appellant Brian High Development Corporation ("Brian High"), is a Utah
corporation doing business in Iron County, State of Utah. Burton K. Nichols ("Nichols")
was the President of Brian High.
Agreement for Sale of Property
On or about March 1,1980, R.D. entered into an agreement ("Agreement")1 to
sell certain property ("Property") situated in Iron County, Utah, which Property is more
particularly described as follows:
The Northeast Quarter of the Southwest Quarter; the Southeast Quarter
of the Southwest Quarter and the Southwest Quarter of the Southeast
Quarter of Section 1, Township 36 South, Range 9 West, Salt Lake
Meridian.
EXCEPTING THEREFROM all oil, gas and mineral rights.
1
R. Vol. I, p. 142; Addendum Exhibit 2. The Addendum contains all documentation (i.e., pleadings and
exhibits) submitted by R.D. in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, as well as the Judgment, Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law. The Addendum is arranged in chronological order based on the date of the pleading--not on
the date of the separate exhibits which were originally attachments to the individual pleadings.
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Together with all water and water rights appurtenant to, used upon or in
connection with said property, except and there is hereby reserved the
water from Water User's Claim No. 1104 filed July 3, 1963, with the State
Engineer's Office on Spring No. 3, together with an easement to
construct and maintain a pipeline over and across the Northwest Quarter
of the Southwest Quarter of said Section 1 and twenty (20) gallons per
minute of the water from Water User's Claim No. 1104 filed July 3, 1963,
with the State Engineer's Office, on Spring No. 1, and an easement to
construct and maintain a pipeline over and across the Northwest Quarter
of the Southeast Quarter and the North half of the Southwest Quarter of
said Section 1, Township 36 South, Range 9 West, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian.2
The Agreement was entered into between Appellee R.D. as "Seller," and a
person named Steve Sevy as "Buyer" and as Trustee for certain beneficiaries whose
complete identities are not known. The Agreement was for transfer of the Property
which included appurtenant water rights as described above. According to the terms
of the Agreement, Sevy agreed to purchase the Property for a total purchase price of
$360,000.00. A $72,000.00 down payment was to be made at the time the Agreement
was executed. Annual installments were to be made in the amount of $75,000.00,
beginning March 1, 1981, and continuing thereafter until the entire principal balance
and accrued interest had been paid in full. All payments were to be applied first to the
payment of interest and second to the reduction of principal. Interest was to accrue
from March 1,1980, on all unpaid portions of the purchase price at the rate of 10% per
annum. As payments were made, certain portions of the land were to be transferred to
Sevy, as provided in Section 3, subsection (a) of the Agreement:
BUYER shall be entitled to receive from Trustee and SELLER hereby
agrees and Trustee is hereby instructed to convey to BUYER one acre by
Special Warranty Deed for each $3,000 paid by BUYER upon the
principal balance due hereunder. • * • *

2

The water rights are the important part of the legal description. The appurtenant water rights involve
Diligence Claim 1104, and the source of water rights set forth in Diligence Claim 1104 consists of three Springs
identified as Spring No. 1, Spring No. 2, and Spring No. 3. R. Vol. II, p. 468; Addendum Exhibit 37.
Rights to Spring No. 3 were specifically reserved in the language of the deed, along with twenty (20) gallons
per minute of the water from Spring No. 1. Many of the issues raised during the pendancy of this case in the trial
court by Brian High involve Spring No. 1 which is also referred to herein as Salt Pile Spring.
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Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, Sevy and R.D. established an escrow
with the Title Company, and executed Escrow Instructions3 and authorized the Title
Company to service the Agreement. R.D. delivered a Warranty Deed4 conveying the
Property to the Title Company as Trustee.
Sevy Transfers Interest to Brian High
On or about April 11,1983, Brian High became the successor to Sevy's interest
in the Property and assumed the obligation under the Agreement.5 Sevy conveyed to
Brian High his interest in the Property by Warranty Deed.6 In addition, Sevy purported
to assign his interest and obligation as Buyer to Brian High and the latter accepted the
same, although to R.D.'s knowledge, no written agreement evidencing the assignment
exists. Brian High has, nonetheless, consented and admitted to such assignment.7

Default Under the Agreement
The scheduled payments were made in 1981, 1982, and 1983, and the Title
Company conveyed to Brian High a total of 31 acres of the Property. Brian High failed
to make the April 1984 payment when due;8 therefore, Brian High defaulted in its
payment obligations under the Agreement. Accordingly, and pursuant to Section 7 of
the Agreement, R.D. sent a written and timely Notice of Default to the Title Company.9
Amendment
On or about April 19, 1984, and subsequent to the default, R.D. and Brian High
executed an amendment ("Amendment") to the Agreement10 whereby R.D.
relinquished Brian High's default in consideration for Brian High's two-fold promise:

3
4
5
6
/
8
9
10

R.
R.
R.
R.
R.
R.
R.
R.

Vol. I,I p. 147; Addendum Exhibits
Vol. II, p. 146; Addendum Exhibit 3.
Vol. I,I p. 142; Addendum Exhibit 2.
Vol. II, p. 149; Addendum Exhibits.
Vol. II, p. 40; Answer f 2 (admission).
Vol. II, p. 40; Answer f3 (admission).
Vol. I,I p. 150; Addendum Exhibit 6.
Vol. I,I p. 152; Addendum Exhibit 7.
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A.

Payment on June 1, 1984, of the remaining unpaid principal
balance under the Agreement of approximately $135,078.00, plus
accrued interest at 10% per annum from April 1,1983, and

B.

No acreage, except the thirty-one (31) acres previously conveyed
to Brian High under the Agreement, would be conveyed to Brian
High until such time as the entire unpaid principal balance and
accrued interest were paid to R.D.

The Agreement was to remain in full force and effect except as to those items
specifically listed in the Amendment.
Second Pefault
Brian High failed to make the June 1,1984, payment as agreed in the
Amendment.11 Pursuant to the default provisions of the Agreement, R.D. sent a written
and timely Notice of Default12 dated June 1, 1984, to both Brian High and the Title
Company.
Under the terms of the Agreement, the occurrence of a default subjected Brian
High to the following consequences:
A.

Cancellation of the Agreement;

B.

Reconveyance by the Title Company to R.D. of the portion of the
Property not theretofore conveyed to Brian High;

C.

Entitlement to costs and attorneys fees incurred by R.D. in the
enforcement of default provisions and remedies (assessed against
Brian High); and

D.

Forfeiture to R.D. of Brian High's previous payments as liquidated
damages for Brian High's non-performance of the Agreement.

Problems With The Title Company
11
12

R. Vol. I, p. 40; Answer f 3 (admission that "scheduled payments have not been made for 1984 and 1985").
R. Vol. I, p. 153; Addendum Exhibit 8.

In a letter dated June 19,1984, 13 R.D. informed the Title Company that Brian
High had failed to make payments and cure the default within the ten (10) day period
provided under the Agreement. R.D. made demand upon the Title Company to
enforce the default provisions of the Agreement and Escrow Instructions and reconvey
to R.D. the portion of the Property not theretofore conveyed.
The Title Company refused to cancel the Agreement and to reconvey the
remaining portion of the Property out of trust to R.D., although R.D. was entitled to
receipt of the remaining Property under the Agreement and Escrow Instructions on
Brian High's default and R.D. had fully complied and performed its obligations under
the Agreement. The Title Company based its refusal to carry out the default
instructions on the basis that its legal counsel had advised the Title Company not to do
so without either a mutual consent letter or a court order.14
R.D. made subsequent demands for performance on the Title Company.15
Finally, in a letter from the Title Company to Brian High, dated August 31,1984, 16 the
Title Company acknowledged its duty and obligation under the Agreement and
Escrow Instructions to convey the remaining property to R.D. by reason of Brian High's
default. However, in that same letter, the Title Company also purported to allow Brian
High additional time to cure the default, which allowance had no basis in the
Agreement or Escrow Instructions.
In a letter dated September 4, 1984,17 five months after Brian High's initial
default, and three months after Brian High's default under the Amendment, Brian High
alleged that its default was justified because R.D. did not have proper title to water
rights to be conveyed by the Agreement. Brian High claimed it had become aware of a
13

R. Vol. I, p. 155; Addendum Exhibit 9.
R. Vol. I, p. 157; Addendum Exhibit 10.
15
See, e.g., R. Vol. I, p. 158; Addendum Exhibit 11.
16
R. Vol. I, p. 159; Addendum Exhibit 12.
1
7
R. Vol. I, p. 66; Brian High's Answer to Cross-Claim, f4 (admission as to "authenticity of documents" in
response to R.D.'s Cross-Claim f 20, found at R. Vol. I, p. 23, alleging letter was sent).
14
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water condemnation proceeding involving the water rights which were part of the
Property.18 The condemnation action had been filed in the Fifth District Court of Iron
County, Utah, and entailed the consolidation of two separate suits. Brian High claimed
its default was justified because of the water condemnation actions. See "Facts"
section on Water Litigation, infra.
Interpleader Action Filed
As a result of the conflicting demands and claims by R.D. and Brian High, the
Title Company filed an interpleader action19 on June 7, 1985, and asked for
declaratory judgment to establish the rights of the parties in relation to the Property.
R.D.,20 Sevy,21 and Brian High22 answered the Title Company's complaint. In its
answer,23 R.D. asserted a Counterclaim against the Title Company for its failure to
cancel the Agreement and reconvey the property, and further, asserted a Cross-claim
against Brian High based on the latter's default. Then, R.D. intervened in the case of

Town of Brian Head vs, Parowan Reservoir Company, et al„ Civil No. 10599.
INITIAL MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

On April 26, 1988, the Title Company filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.24
R.D. responded to the Title Company's motion for summary judgment and made its
own motion for partial summary judgment against the Title Company, Sevy, and Brian
High.25 The Title Company noticed its motion for hearing for May 17, 1988.
The Title Company and R.D., through their respective counsel, appeared on
May 17, 1988, before the court and argued their motions for summary judgment. Brian
18

R. Vol. I, p. 66; Brian High's Answer to Cross-Claim, f 4 (admission as to "authenticity of documents" in
response to R.D/s Cross-Claim 1120, found at R. Vol. I, p. 23, alleging letter was sent but denying "legal
conclusions").
19
R.Vol. I, p. 1.
20
R. Vol. I, p. 23.
21
R. Vol. I, p. 40.
22
R. Vol. I, p. 40.
23
R. Vol. I, p. 23.
24
R. Vol. I, p. 99.
25
R. Vol. I, p. 126; Addendum Exhibit 1.

High did not appear, and did not file any responsive pleadings or affidavits to the
motions. The court entered summary judgment against Brian High, and ordered the
Title Company to enforce the default provisions of the Agreement and Escrow
Instructions. The court then continued to a later date the hearing upon the Title
Company and R.D.'s motions for summary judgment against one another.
At that later hearing, June 14, 1988, Attorney Michael Park appeared on behalf
of Brian High and served counsel with the Affidavit of David J. Smith,26 who was the
original counsel for Brian High, the Affidavit of Burton K. Nichols,27 and a
Memorandum in Opposition to Motions for Summary Judgment.28 Notwithstanding the
fact that judgment had already been entered against Brian High nearly a month prior,
and despite the lack of any motion to set that judgment aside, the court set the
judgment aside and directed the parties to return the following month for a rehearing of
all the motions.
Prior to the complete rehearing, the parties submitted additional memoranda
and affidavits. Brian High submitted a second Affidavit of Burton K. Nichols29
purporting to raise an issue of fact as to Brian High's justification for defaulting under
the Agreement by claiming R.D. had made representations about the quantity of water
during the negotiations for the initial sale of the Property and that there was litigation
pending involving the water rights included in the Property. R.D. filed a responsive
memorandum30 and affidavits31 to dispel Nichols* assertions and demonstrate the
lack of any factual dispute. On or about August 23, 1988, the court heard the motions,

R.Vol. I, p. 175.
R.Vol. I, p. 179.
R.Vol. I, p. 185.
R. Vol. I, p. 203; Addendum Exhibit 30.
R. Vol. I, p. 209; Addendum Exhibit 14.
R. Vol. I, p. 260, Addendum Exhibit 23; R. Vol. I, p. 257; Addendum Exhibit 24.
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and denied them. Trial was set in this matter for June 7, 1989;32 however, it was
postponed upon the court's own Motion to June 29, 1989.33

Nichols Claims Parol Agreement
In preparation for trial, counsel for R.D. scheduled the deposition of Burton K.
Nichols, President of Brian High, to be taken on March 28, 1989. Nichols had
conducted the negotiations with R.D. that culminated in the Agreement between R.D.
and Sevy. In Nichols1 Affidavit34, he stated that he was the only individual who could
testify on behalf of Brian High as to facts supporting Brian High's defense, which was
that Nichols claimed that R.D. represented the sum total of the water rights being sold
by R.D. which were to come from Salt Pile Spring as 136 acre-feet. It should be noted
that these belated allegations were first raised by Brian High in August 1988, four
years after Brian High's default under the Agreement and Amendment.
R.D. has made timely objections to Nichols1 parol evidence about the quantity of
water to be transferred under the Agreement and has repeatedly moved that his
evidence be stricken on the grounds that it violates the parol evidence rule and lacks
foundation.
The language of the Agreement and Property description are clear; the
language shows that it was agreed that the water rights being conveyed were those
appurtenant to the land being transferred. The Property description refers to the water
rights, in pertinent part:
Together with all water and water rights appurtenant to, used upon or in
connection with said property, except and there is hereby reserved
[certain water rights].

32
33
34

R. Vol. II, p. 407; Addendum Exhibit 28.
R. Vol. II, p. 409; Addendum Exhibit 29.
R. Vol. II, p. 411; Addendum Exhibit 30.

The Agreement shows no attempt to state an exact quantity of water and the
Agreement represents the entire agreement of the parties, as stated on Page 4,
Section 10 of the Agreement:
It is understood and agreed that there are no representations, covenants,
or agreement between the parties hereto except as herein specifically set
forth.
Notwithstanding the obvious importance of Nichols1 testimony to Brian High's
defense, counsel for R.D. was informed by Brian High's counsel in a letter dated March
22, 1989,35 that Nichols would not submit himself to a deposition. In addition, in a
conversation on the same date, counsel for Brian High assured counsel for R.D. that
Nichols would not be a witness at trial.36 Brian High then agreed that Nichols would
not be called by Brian High as a witness at the trial, and based upon that agreement,
R.D. agreed to cancel Nichols1 deposition.37
Attempted Settlement and Brian Hiah's Bankruptcy
During the month of May, 1989, a settlement of R.D.'s claim against Brian High
was attempted, but failed. Brian High thereafter attempted to compel R.D. to accept
Brian High's settlement proposal by threatening to file bankruptcy. Three weeks
before trial, counsel for R.D. received a letter dated June 7, 1989,38 from counsel for
Brian High stating that unless R.D. would agree to release additional acreage from
escrow to Brian High, Brian High would file bankruptcy. Attached to the letter was a
copy of a fully completed and executed Petition for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy.39 R.D.
rejected the ultimatum given in Brian High's letter.
On June 22, 1989, only one week prior to trial, counsel for Brian High called
R.D.'s counsel to state that Brian High had filed a Petition for Bankruptcy and that there

35
36
37
38
39

R.
R.
R.
R.
R.

Vol. II, p. 415;
Vol. II, p. 403;
Vol. II, p. 403;
Vol. II, p. 418;
Vol. II, p. 418;

Addendum Exhibit 31.
Addendum Exhibit 27.
Addendum Exhibit 27.
Addendum Exhibit 33.
Addendum Exhibit 33.

would be a motion with the Fifth District Court to stay the trial proceedings.40 On June
27, 1989, only two days before trial, Brian High filed notice with the court that it had
filed a Chapter 11 Bankruptcy proceeding, Case No. 89A-03796.41 On June 29,
1989, the very day that trial was set, a stay42 was ordered in the case as to Brian
High.
Title Company and R.D. Settle
On June 30, 1989, the Title Company and R.D. entered into a settlement
agreement, and by court order dated July 10, 1989,43 R.D.'s counterclaim against the
Title Company was dismissed with prejudice and on the merits.

Dismissal of Bankruptcy
During the pendancy of the bankruptcy, R.D. made a motion that Brian High's
bankruptcy be dismissed. Brian High failed to file a response or to even appear at the
hearing on the motion. On January 17,1990, the United States Bankruptcy Judge
ordered44 that Brian High's bankruptcy be dismissed based upon finding that Brian
High had not engaged in significant business activities since filing its petition and that
the bankruptcy action was commenced primarily for the purpose of delaying the Fifth
Judicial District Court action.
Renewal of Summary Judgment Motion
Then, R.D. filed a Motion for Reconsideration of R.D.'s Motion for Summary
Judgment45 based on the grounds that Nichols, the principal witness relied on by
Brian High, had disclaimed any interest in the law suit and refused to testify,46 and that

40
41
42
43
44
45
46
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R.
R.
R.
R.
R.
R.
R.

4 O

Vol. III, p. 403; Addendum
Vol. III, p. 442; Addendum
Vol. III, p. 447; Addendum
Vol. III, pp. 383, 386.
Vol. III, p. 449; Addendum
Vol. III, p. 390; Addendum
Vol. III, p. 415; Addendum

Exhibit 27.
Exhibit 34.
Exhibit 35.
Exhibit 36.
Exhibit 25.
Exhibit 31.

the United States Bankruptcy Court had dismissed Brian High's bankruptcy which had
been brought for tactical delay.
Water Rights Litigation And Brian High's Defenses
During the pendency of the trial court litigation, certain belated defenses were
raised by Brian High in an attempt to justify and excuse its default under the
Agreement and Amendment. One of those excuses, discussed above, was Nichols*
claims of a parol agreement as to the quantity of water. The other excuses for default
involve three court cases involving water rights, and Brian High has alleged that the
water rights under the Agreement are in dispute because of the water rights litigation.
The water rights litigation will be discussed chronologically in order of filing: the
General Adjudication, the Troniers, and the Comprehensive Condemnation.
General Adjudication
There is pending a General Adjudication entitled In The Matter of the General

Determination of the Rights to the Use of All the Water. Both Surface and
Underground. Within the Drainage Area of the Beaver River—Escalante Vallev and All
Tributaries, in Millard. Beaver. Iron. Washington. Kane, and Garfield Counties in Utah.
Civil No. 4415. This was a general adjudication commenced by the State Water
Engineer in 1967, "to determine the rights to the use of all the water, both surface and
underground, within the drainage area of the Parowan Valley Division of the BeaverEscalante Valley."47 According to the Pretrial Order in that matter dated 1970, the only
issue still pending as to Diligence Claim 1104 is ownership of certain stockwatering
rights.48 The Property's irrigation and domestic watering rights comprising Diligence
Claim 1104 are not disputed in the General Adjudication.
The Property's appurtenant stockwatering rights are estimated at less than two
acre-feet, which represents a very insignificant amount. Two independent experts
47
48
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have confirmed that less than two acre-feet are still involved in the General
Adjudication.
R.D. submitted an affidavit from a water expert Kendrick J. Hafen49 who is
licensed in the State of Utah as a registered land surveyor and an engineer-in-training
since 1981 and an attorney since 1984. Mr. Hafen is familiar with the engineering
principles and procedures utilized by the Office of the Utah State Engineer in
quantifying water rights. Based upon engineering principles, the stockwatering right
as to that portion of Diligence Claim 1104 appurtenant to the Property is less than 2
acre feet of water.
R.D. also submitted an affidavit from State Water Engineer Gerald W. Stoker,50
who is also an expert in principles and procedures utilized by the Office of the Utah
State Engineer in quantifying water rights. He concurred that the stockwatering right
as to the subject Property is less than 2 acre feet and further stated that it was his
opinion that the stockwatering right is valid and properly established by diligence use.
In addition, it is important to note that Nichols was himself a party to the General
Adjudication51 which began in 1967—long before Nichols negotiated the purchase of
the Property with R.D; therefore, at the time he negotiated the purchase from R.D.,
Nichols was on actual notice of the issues in the General Adjudication involving
Diligence Claim 1104.
Tronier
The second suit is a condemnation action filed by the Town of Brian Head
against Gilbert and Madeline Tronier entitled Town of Brian Head vs. Gilbert R. Tronier
and Madeline Tronier. Civil No. 10206. In that action, the Town sought to condemn Lot
3, Block F, Cedar Breaks Homesite, Unit B. The Town alleged that it needed this lot
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because a spring was located thereon that was essential to the development of the
Town's culinary water system. That spring was Spring No. 1 also known as Salt Pile
Spring. Troniers claimed they owned water rights on Lot 3 from Spring No. 1 and that
they owned appurtenant water rights on two contiguous lots (Lots 9 and 10), which
rights had their source in Spring No. 1. Besides compensation for condemnation of
the land, they sought compensation for the loss of water as to all three lots.
However, Troniers did not claim exclusive rights in Spring 1—in their answer to
the Town of Brian Head's complaint, Troniers stated:
Defendants Tronier admit that there are other persons who own interests
in water rights arising from springs located on the property of Defendants
Tronier, and affirmatively allege that it is necessary to join said
Defendants as parties to this action before a just adjudication of the
subject matter of this action can be made.52
Before this case was decided, and on June 27, 1984, the Town of Brian Head
filed a comprehensive water condemnation action. Consequently, the Troniers1 action
involving Lot 3 was resolved as follows:53

Summary Judgment was entered

condemning Lot 3, the land only; the question of Troniers1 ownership interest in Spring
No. 1 and entitlement to compensation therefor was reserved for and joined with the
newly filed water condemnation suit and the Town was admonished to name all
parties showing an interest in Spring No. 1 in the water condemnation suit.
Brian High did not raise this as a defense until September 4, 1984 which was
well after both of its defaults—April 1, 1984 and June 1, 1984.
Comprehensive Condemnation
The Town of Brian Head filed a comprehensive condemnation action
"(Comprehensive Condemnation") to acquire water for the Town. That action was
entitled Town of Brian Head vs. Parowan Reservoir Company. Parowan Reservoir
Shareholders, and John Does 1 through 100. Civil No. 10599, commenced by
52
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resolution of the Town Council of the Town of Brian Head on June 26, 1984. Note that
the action was filed after both of Brian High's defaults—April 1, 1984 , and June 1,
1984, and not even raised as a defense until September 4, 1984.
The Town of Brian Head eventually abandoned its effort to condemn water
rights, and accordingly, dismissed the Comprehensive Condemnation by Order of the
Court dated November 17, 1987.54 However, the Order of Dismissal reserved one
issue for later determination (hearing), which issue was Troniers1 right to receive
attorneys1 fees from the Town of Brian Head. Nonetheless, the condemnation, itself,
was abandoned and dismissed and thus no challenge remains as to the ownership of
Spring No. 1.

June 5th Hearing
The hearing on R.D.'s Motion for Reconsideration was scheduled for June 5,
1990, and the reporter's transcript is part of the record. At the June 5th hearing,
counsel for Brian High appeared without any affidavits or other evidence and without
having contacted the State Water Engineer but proffered testimony as to what he
thought the State Water Engineer would say. Brian High's counsel urged that the
testimony of the State Water Engineer would show that the water rights were tied up in
litigation and that the Diligence Claim No. 1104 water rights were in dispute. Counsel
for Brian High further urged that the Tronier claims to the water in the Comprehensive
Condemnation created a dispute. Based on Brian High's representations, the judge
decided he needed evidence from the State Water Engineer.
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So, counsel for R.D. and Brian High interviewed the State Water Engineer and
an affidavit55 was submitted for the court. There was a hearing on June 19,1990, as a
follow up to discuss the information from the State Water Engineer.
June 19th Hearing
The transcript of the June 19,1990, hearing is part of the record. The Affidavit of
the State Water Engineer was discussed at the hearing. The State Water Engineer's
records and engineering expertise showed that less than two acre-feet of
stockwatering rights set out in Diligence Claim 1104 were left in dispute in the General
Adjudication Suit. Accordingly, the judge found that fact (i.e., relating to the General
Adjudication Suit) to be immaterial. For summary judgment, the disputed fact must be
material and genuinely controverted to preclude summary judgment being entered.
The judge stated, in pertinent part:
THE COURT:
It appears that the — the land was transferred with
appurtenant water rights, and the evidence shows that appurtenant water
rights are available. And there's no legitimate dispute as to how much
those — or the quantity of water that was involved.56
All the issues which had been earlier raised by Brian High were again raised,
discussed and dispensed with at the June 19th hearing. The court found no genuine
issue as to any material fact and entered summary judgment as a matter of law against
Brian High and in favor of R.D.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Point I.

Summary judgment. Summary judgment should be granted when

there are not genuine issues as to any material facts. Each of the issues Brian High
raised in hopes of forestalling the entering of summary judgment were not genuine
issues of material facts.

55
56
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Point II.

No Defense or Justification for Default. The clear language of the

contract explains that default occurs when payments are not made when due. Brian
High has admitted to failing to make payments as agreed. Brian High has attempted to
excuse its default by alleging two different theories.
Parol Evidence. Nichols made claims of a parol agreement between
R.D. and Sevy and its assignee Brian High as to the quantity of water. First,
R.D. has always been ready, willing and able to transfer "appurtenant" water
rights. Second, parol evidence is inadmissible because the language of the
Agreement is not ambiguous. Third, Nichols is the only one (by his own
admission) who can testify to this parol agreement and Brian High has agreed
not to call Nichols as a witness at trial.
Litigation Involving Water Rights. There are three law suits which
Brian High would have the Court believe place the Property's water rights in
dispute. However, the mere existence of these suits is immaterial, and does not
challenge the water rights sold by R.D. Furthermore, the assertion of these suits
as a defense or excuse was fatally belated—months after default.
(a)

The General Adjudication was begun in 1967, and as of

1970, there are less than two-acre feet of stockwatering rights (not
domestic or irrigation) pertaining to the subject Property which are still
involved in the adjudication. Nichols himself was a party to the General
Adjudication, as well as the negotiator of the Agreement with R.D., and
was thus on actual notice of the General Adjudication long before the
Agreement with R.D. was entered and the default occurred.
(b)

The Troniers' Condemnation, as such, has been dismissed

with none of the water being condemned. Further, Troniers have
admitted that others also own interest in Spring No. 1.

(c)

The Comprehensive Condemnation was not even pending

when Brian High defaulted on payment. In 1987, the Town of Brian Head
abandoned its efforts to condemn the water involved in the
Comprehensive Condemnation, and all issues have been dismissed
except the issue of Troniers' attorneys1 fees.
(d)

Pursuant to the doctrine of equitable conversion, the

purchaser (Brian High) acquires all the incidents of ownership except
legal title and therefore bears the benefits and losses that may accrue to
the property such as a condemnation action.
Point III

The State Water Engineer, through his affidavit, was involved in

the instant case in two capacities—he acted in an administrative capacity utilizing the
records and procedures of his office and in the capacity of an expert witness. He did
not act in an adjudicative capacity. Further, his affidavit was ordered by the court
based on Brian High's urgings to the trial court.
Point IV

It is not necessary for the case to be remanded for the trial court to

quiet title in the water rights to the property. Appurtenant water rights were available at
all times pertinent hereto, as set forth in the Agreement, and no one disputes R.D.'s
ownership in "appurtenant" water.

ARGUMENT
POINT I

SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED

Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states in pertinent part:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.
To prevent summary judgment, a factual issue must be essential (i.e. material)
to the resolution of the matter in controversy. Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice
DA^c -i^

and Procedure: Civil 2d §2725 (1983). In other words, "[a] dispute as to an
immaterial fact does not preclude summary judgment. [Emphasis added.]" Id- Once it
is determined whether certain facts are material, the court determines whether any of
them are genuinely in dispute. To bring facts into dispute, there must be more
asserted than the opponent's opinions and conclusions. Webster v. Sill. 675 P.2d
1170 (Utah 1983). Further, summary judgment is not precluded simply because some
fact remains in dispute; the disputed fact must be material and "genuinely
controverted." Heglar Ranch. Inc. v. Stillman. 619 P.2d 1390 (Utah 1980); Keslerv.
Kesler. 583 P.2d 87 (Utah 1978).
At the final hearing on the motion for summary judgment, the transcript for the
hearing bears out that the trial court judge found no genuine issues of any material
fact. The pertinent part of the oral argument at the June 19, 1990, hearing went as
follows:57
THE COURT:
I had indicated that the reason that I had denied the
motion for summary judgment previously was that there appeared
to be a factual dispute as to what was actually involved in the other
cases where this water — these water rights may have been
included. And it appears —at least I understood from our
discussion — that of all the water appurtenant to this property, only
two acre feet might be involved in some other litigation.
MR. WADE [R.D.]: Less than two acre feet. And the state engineer's
Affidavit states that his position is that the stock watering right,
which is left at issue in that general adjudication, is valid as it is set
out on that diligence claim.
THE COURT:
All right. Mr. Park, what is your position with regard
to the motion for summary judgment at this point?
MR. PARK [Brian High]: At the last hearing, I represented to the Court
that there was a dispute concerning the water, and that the only
one that could answer that dispute was the state engineer. And
after Mr. Wade and I talked to the engineer and reviewed what he
would say in his Affidavit, it was my opinion that maybe the Court
would determine that the two acre feet in dispute was not a
substantial breach of this contract; so, I didn't want to
R. Vol. II, p. 545; June 19th Hearing Transcript, p. 3.
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misrepresent anything to the Court, and that's why I don't object to
this reconsideration of the motion for summary judgment.
THE COURT:
You're not stipulating that I should grant the motion
for summary judgment?
MR. PARK [Brian High]: That's correct. I did mention to the Court
previously that — that there was one other issue that we could
have raised or that may be in the file, and that's that Mr. Nichols
claims in his Affidavit, that it was represented to him that there was
136 acre feet of water with this property.
THE COURT:
And, in fact, there's only — what? — 20 or so acre
feet? But as I understand it, you don't intend to call Mr. Nichols,
and have so represented to counsel? And based upon that
representation, he hasn't been deposed; is that correct?
MR. WADE [R.D.]: That's correct, Your Honor.
MR. PARK [Brian High]:

That's correct.

MR. WADE [R.D.]: Furthermore, we've briefed [... ] and argued to the
Court that [... ] his Affidavit is a clear violation of the parol
evidence rule. * * * *
THE COURT:
All right. I'm going to grant the motion for summary
judgment, it appearing that there's no material issue of fact that
has been raised by the defense — or by the defendants to that
motion for summary judgment. It appears that the — the land was
transferred with appurtenant water rights, and the evidence shows
that appurtenant water rights are available. And there's no
legitimate dispute as to how much those — or the quantity of water
that was involved.
The parties had ample time to brief the issues and the parties had more than
five opportunities to appear before the trial court and argue their respective positions.
In the final argument before the trial court, counsel for Brian High could not, when
asked, supply the court with any material fact that was still in dispute. The judge
clearly found there were no genuine issues of material fact, and entered summary
judgment as a matter of law in Appellee R.D.'s favor. Appellee R.D. respectfully moves
this Court to uphold the lower court's ruling.
POINT II

THERE IS NO VALID DEFENSE OR JUSTIFICATION FOR
BRIAN HIGH'S DEFAULT UNDER THE AGREEMENT
AND AMENDMENT

Brian High has admitted that it did not make payments "in 1984 and 1985" when
those payments were due.58 According to the Agreement,59 Section 7, default is
when payments are not made when due. Brian High has raised several defenses
during the course of the litigation, in order to excuse or justify its default under the
Agreement and Amendment. Each of Brian High's attempted justifications for default
has been fully addressed and disposed of by R.D. The alleged defenses or excuses
can be summarized as follows:
A.

Nichols' parol evidence that R.D. had made representations that there
were 136 acre-feet of water appurtenant to the land involved in the
Property transfer to Sevy;60 and

B.

Litigation involving appurtenant water rights included in the Property,
which suits are:
(1)

In The Matter of the General Determination of the Rights to the Use
of All the Water. Both Surface and Underground. Within the
Drainage Area of the Beaver River — Escalante Vallev and All
Tributaries, in Millard. Beaver. Iron. Washington. Kane, and
Garfield Counties in Utah. Civil No. 4415.

(2)

Town of Brian Head vs. Gilbert R. Tronier and Madeline Tronier.
Civil No. 10206.

(3)

Town of Brian Head vs. Parowan Reservoir Company. Parowan
Reservoir Shareholders, and John Does 1 through 100. Civil No.
10599.

None of the excuses or defenses justify Brian High's default. The amount of
water "appurtenant" to the Property was quantifiable by standard engineering
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principles when the Agreement was entered into. If exact quantity of water had been
an important part of the Agreement, why was it not included in the language?
Further, these alleged excuses or justifications for default were raised quite
some time after default. Brian High's first default in its payment obligations occurred
on April 1, 1984, and was resolved by the "Amendment to Trust Agreement" executed
on April 19, 1984. Brian High did not attempt to justify the default by any assertions
that water rights were questionable or that a water condemnation action might impact
those rights.61 Brian High's next and enduring default occurred on June 1, 1984,
when it again failed to make its payment as agreed to in the Amendment. Once again,
there was no excuse given at or around the time of the default to excuse or justify nonpayment. R. D. gave the notice required in the Agreement allowing Brian High ten
days to cure the default, and Brian High failed to respond either with a payment or an
excuse.
A.

R.D. has at all times been capable of transferring the
"9PPUrtengnt" wgfcr it ggreed tQ PQnvey in the Deed gnd
Agreement

The language in the Deed62 and Agreement63 as to the water portion of the
Property description is as follows:
Together with all water and water rights appurtenant to, used upon or in
connection with said property, except and there is hereby reserved the
water from Water Users Claim No. 1104 filed July 3, 1963 with the State
Engineer's Office on Spring No. 3, together with an Easement to
construct and maintain pipe line over and across the Northwest Quarter
of the Southwest Quarter of said Section 1 and twenty (20) gallons per
minute of the water from Water Users Claim No. 1104 filed July 3, 1963
with the State Engineer's Office, on Spring No. 1, and an easement to
construct and maintain a pipe line over and across the Northwest Quarter
of the Southeast Quarter and the North Half of the Southwest Quarter of
said Section 1, Township 36 South, Range 9 West, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian.
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From this language it is "crystal clear," even "prima facie" clear, that the intent of
the grantor, R.D., was to convey only that water which was "appurtenant" to the land
being conveyed excepting those water rights specifically excluded from transfer. The
term "appurtenant" is a legal "term of art" commonly used in deeds and real estate
contracts to define or describe the character and extent of water and/or mineral rights
passing to the grantee. Water is said to be "appurtenant" to the land upon which it is
used when it is used in direct connection with the real estate and when it is necessary
to the beneficial enjoyment of the land. Thompson v. McKinney. 91 Utah 89, 63 P.2d
1056 (1937). The amount of water that is appurtenant to any particular tract of land is
the amount which was beneficially used upon the land immediately prior to the
conveyance. Stephens v. Burton. 546 P.2d 240 (Utah 1976); see also, Utah Code
Ann. §73-1-11 (1953, as amended). There is nothing in the Deed or Agreement to
suggest that any specific quantity of water was to be transferred, and from the
description of the term "appurtenant" in the foregoing cases, use of that term in deeds
and agreements does not imply any specific quantity.
B.

Parol evidence is inadmissible to contradict a written
agreement's clear and unambiguous terms

Parol evidence is inadmissible to contradict or change a written agreement's
terms which are clear, and unambiguous. E-A Strout Western Realty Agency. Inc. v.
BroderiCk, 522 P.2d 144 (Utah 1974); Boise Cascade Corp.. Bldg. Materials Distrib.
Div. v. Stonewood Dev. Corp.. 655 P.2d 668 (Utah 1982). This same rule applies in
the context of a legal description in a deed or contract. Where a deed is plain and
unambiguous, parol evidence is not admissible to vary its terms. Hartman v. Potter.
596 P.2d 653 (Utah 1979). Moreover, a description of property in a deed is prima facie
an expression of the intention of the grantor. ]£.
The case of Hartman v. Potter, supra, is particularly instructive here and similar
on its facts to the case at hand. In that case, the original owner ("O.O.") of a 160-acre

parcel of property owned all of the mineral rights thereon. O.O. conveyed a 1/2 interest
in the mineral rights to one Bennett. Later, 0 . 0 . sold the land to Hartman and in the
warranty deed to Hartman, 0 . 0 . reserved a 3/4 interest in all mineral rights. A person
named Potter succeeded to O.O.'s interest. Hartman brought an action seeking to
quiet title in himself to a full 1/4 of all the mineral rights that had ever existed on the
160-acre parcel. Potter resisted by arguing that O.O.'s intent in reserving 3/4 of the
mineral rights was to reserve O.O.'s full 1/2 interest (the other 1/2 having been
conveyed previously to Bennett). The trial court entered summary judgment in Potter's
favor holding that 0 . 0 . had intended to reserve his full 1/2 interest in the mineral rights
and had not intended to convey any fraction thereof to Hartman. That decision was
vacated on appeal. The Utah Supreme Court noted that neither party had argued that
the deed in question (0.0. to Hartman) was ambiguous. It therefore observed:
In the absence of ambiguity, the construction of deeds is a question of
law for the court, and the main object in construing a deed is to ascertain
the intention of the parties, especially that of the grantor, from the
language used. The description of the property in a deed is prima facie
an expression of the intention of the grantor and the term "intention," as
applied to the construction of a deed, is to be distinguished from its usual
connotation. When so applied, it is a term of art and signifies a meaning
of the writing.
id, at 656.
The Court cited the controlling rule with respect to the inadmissibility of Parol
Evidence in the absence of ambiguity, thus:
Deeds are to be construed like other written instruments and where a
deed is plain and unambiguous, parol evidence is not admissible to vary
its terms. ...It is also well known that the intention of the parties to a
conveyance is open to interpretation only when the words used are
ambiguous.
Id,
The Court held that the reservation language of the deed was clear and
unequivocal, and therefore, as a matter of law the intent and effect of that language (towit: reserving 3/4 of the mineral rights of O.O., grantor) was to convey a 1/8th interest

in the minerals appurtenant to the total 160 acre parcel to Hartman, reserving a 3/8ths
interest to O.O. since the extent of O.O.fs interest in the minerals at the time of the
conveyance to Hartman was only a 1/2 interest. The Court's own language is
particularly apt:
Since Potters could not convey, except, or reserve more than they
owned, and since the recital makes no reference to the already severed
one-half mineral interest in Bennett no longer "belonging" to the land, we
can only conclude that Potters excepted three-fourths of their fractional
one-half interest in the minerals. Consequently, the deed in question
conveyed a one-eighth mineral interest to plaintiffs and "reserved" to
Potters a three-eighths interest, all of which, added to Bennett's one-half
interest, comprises the whole mineral interest concerned.
Jjt at 657-658.
In the instant case, there has been no assertion that the language of the
Agreement,64 and specifically the legal description therein, is anything but clear and
unequivocal. Nor could such an argument ever be made in this case in good faith.
Thus, the question as to the quantity and nature of water rights intended in the
Property conveyance is one of law to be determined by the Court from the language of
the Agreement description, only. The language of the Agreement is clear that R.D.
intended to transfer its ownership in the "appurtenant" water. This intent is unaffected
by Brian High's allegations that Nichols thought there would be 136 acre-feet of water
involved in the conveyance and whether or not there may be litigation pending
involving the "appurtenant" water rights.
C.

Nichols' parol evidence is inadmissible to vary the plain
language of the Agreement

The parol evidence adduced by Brian High in Mr. Nichols1 affidavit65 is clearly
inadmissible, and is, moreover, in direct conflict with the plain language of the
Agreement.66 Nichols claims67 he conducted negotiations with R.D. that culminated in
R.
R.
R.
R.
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the Agreement between R.D. and Sevy, and that he was the only individual who could
testify on behalf of Brian High as to facts supporting Brian High's defense that R.D.
represented the water rights as 136 acre-feet. R.D. has made timely objections to
Nichols1 parol evidence and has moved that this be stricken.
The Agreement and Property description68 are clear as to what water rights
were intended to be transferred:
Together with all water and water rights appurtenant to, used upon or in
connection with said property, except and there is hereby reserved
[certain water rights].
The Agreement69 and its written language represent the entire agreement of the
parties:
It is understood and agreed that there are no representations, covenants,
or agreements between the parties hereto except as herein specifically
set forth.
The intent of the parties is manifest in the Agreement and there is no need to
resort to parol evidence to discover the intent of the parties. There have been no
claims of ambiguity of the Agreement or Property description. The language of the
Agreement speaks for itself, as Brian High claimed in its Answer, ^47°
Furthermore, even if Nichols1 parol evidence were to be considered, Nichols
has refused to submit himself to a deposition. Based on Nichols1 refusal, Brian High
has assured R.D. that Nichols will not be a witness at trial71 and has stated the same to
the trial court judge:
MR. PARK [Brian High]: * * * I did mention to the Court previously that
— that there was one other issue that we could have raised or that may
be in the file, and that's that Mr. Nichols claims in his Affidavit, that it was
represented to him that there was 136 acre feet of water with this
property.
R. Vol. I, p. 142; Addendum Exhibit 2.
R. Vol. I, p. 142; Addendum Exhibit 2.
R. Vol. I, p. 66; Brian High's Answer to Cross-claim, f 4 ("With respect to paragraphs 9,11, 13, 20, and 46,
admit the authenticity of the documents referred to in said paragraphs; however, deny the legal conclusions
contained therein, and allege that said documents speak for themselves.").
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THE COURT:
And, in fact, therms only — what? — 20 or so acre
feet? But as I understand it, you don't intend to call Mr. Nichols, and have
so represented to counsel? And based upon that representation,
[Nichols] hasn't been deposed; is that correct?
MR. WADE [R.D.]

That's correct, Your Honor.

Mr. PARK [Brian High]:

That's correct.

Nichols' claims are parol evidence and inadmissible because the language of
the Agreement is clear and no one has alleged otherwise. Furthermore, because
Nichols will not be a witness, there is no proof as to the alleged misrepresentation of
the quantity of water to be transferred.
D.

The litigation involving the appurtenant water rights is no
defense or excuse to justify Brian High's default

Brian High attempts to excuse its default by pointing to three suits relating to the
water rights appurtenant to the property to show, just like with Nichols' claims, that the
quantity of water is in dispute. However, none of the suits is a valid defense or excuse
for several reasons.
First, as stated above, R.D. intended to transfer its interest in the appurtenant
water rights—R.D. did not quantify its interest in the Agreement and if the specific
quantity had been so important, Sevy or Nichols should have insisted that a specific
quantity be stated in the Agreement. Evidence outside the Agreement, such as
alleged parol agreements, has no affect on R.D.'s ability and intention to transfer its
"appurtenant" water rights.
Second, the facts of each law suit show that none of the suits provide a valid
justification for default.
General Adjudication. The litigation which was first in time was the General
Adjudication for adjudication of water in the Beaver River drainage area. This action
was commenced by the State Water Engineer in 1967 and the only issue as to the
water rights involved in the Agreement is the ownership of certain stockwatering rights.
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Those stockwatering rights consist of less than two acre-feet. The Property's more
significant water rights, i.e., irrigation and domestic watering rights, are not in question
in the General Adjudication.

In addition, Nichols was himself a party to the General

Adjudication long before he negotiated the purchase of the Property with R.D. and was
therefore on actual notice of the existence of the General Adjudication and its issues at
all times relevant herein. To say that the General Adjudication suddenly became an
excuse for default in April 1984, or June 1984, after the General Adjudication had
been pending for nearly seventeen years and Nichols, the President of Brian High and
Agreement negotiator, was on notice of its existence and issues for seventeen years,
is ridiculous.
Troniers. The second suit was a condemnation action filed by the Town of
Brian Head in September 1983, against the Troniers to acquire title to land and water
rights in Spring No. 1 which is also a spring where some of the Property's water
originates. That action was resolved as follows: summary judgment was entered
condemning the land only, and the question of Troniers1 ownership interest in the
spring (and therefore, any entitlement to compensation for condemnation of water
rights) was reserved for and joined with a general water condemnation suit which had
been brought by the Town. Troniers were not the only owners in the spring, which
Troniers admitted in their answer in their individual condemnation—there are other
people who own interests in the water originating from the spring. Furthermore, the
Troniers1 action is no longer pending as an independent action. The Troniers1 suit
does not provide a justification for default.
Comprehensive Condemnation. The Town of Brian Head filed a
comprehensive condemnation action to acquire water for the Town on June 27, 1984.
This action was commenced nearly three months after Brian High's original default on
April 1, 1984, and about a month after Brian High's default under the Amendment. The

Comprehensive Condemnation was not even raised as an excuse for Brian High's
default until September 1984.
On November, 17,1987, the Town of Brian Head having abandoned its effort to
condemn water rights, by order of the court, the general condemnation action was
dismissed. By that order, the court reserved only one issue regarding Troniers for later
determination, which issue was Troniers' entitlement to attorney's fees. There are
clearly no issues involving water rights pending in this action.
Equitable Conversion. With an enforceable executory contract for sale of land,
the purchaser "acquires all of the incidents of ownership except legal title... .[and]...
is therefore in equity properly regarded as the owner of the property." Jelco. Inc. v.
Third Judicial Dist. Court. 29 Utah 2d 472, 511 P.2d 739, 745 (1973).
[Ojrdinarily, the purchaser is entitled to any benefit that may accrue to the
property and must also bear any loss or depreciation to the property,
absent the vendor's fault or negligence. 92 C.J.S. Vendor and Purchaser
§295. The purchaser bears such risks, based on the principle of
equitable ownership, even when the vendor retains possession of the
property subject to a conveyance at some later date.
Utah State Medical Ass'n v. Utah State Employees Credit Union. 655 P.2d 643, 644
(Utah 1982) citing as support Jelco. Inc. v. Third Judicial Dist. Court. 29 Utah 2d 472,
511 P.2d 739, 741 (1973), and 77 Am. Jur. 2d Vendor and Purchaser §357.
In Jelco. Inc. v. Third Judicial Dist. Court. 29 Utah 2d 472, 511 P.2d 739 (1973)
the Jeremys were sellers of a tract of land in Salt Lake. The tract was divided in 11
separate parcels with deeds for the parcels placed in escrow, and as each annual
payment was made, a particular parcel was to be delivered to the purchaser. With four
annual payments still to be made, part of the tract of land was condemned by the City
of Salt Lake for expansion of the municipal airport. The City deposited 1.4 million
dollars in court and the buyer's assignee, Jelco, disputed Jeremys' entitlement to any
of the 1.4 million dollars. The trial court found that Jeremys were entitled to a portion of

the 1.4 million and Jelco appealed. The Utah Supreme Court stated the general rule
to be applied in such cases:
In such an executory contract the vendee acquires all of the incidents of
ownership except legal title. He is therefore in equity properly regarded
as the owner of the property. Thus, in the absence of an agreement to
the contrary, where a condemnor takes land [which is] subject to an
executory contract, it is the vendee who is normally entitled to any
condemnation award for the land so taken. It is he who is entitled to the
benefit of any increase and who must bear the detriment of any
decrease, in the value of the property; whereas, the vendor has only
legal title. In regard to the purchase price, what he is entitled to is to have
it paid in accordance with the terms of the contract. He is of course also
entitled to retain the legal title as security for its performance, and in case
of default, to seek the remedies provided therein.
Id- at 475.
In summary, the Agreement for sale of the Property transferred the risk of loss to
Sevy and his successor in interest Brian High, because the purchaser acquires "all of
the incidents of title" and "bears the detriments" caused by condemnation actions. The
Town of Brian Head's two condemnation actions were commenced after the
Agreement was entered into and the "incidents of ownership" had passed to Sevy and
subsequently to its successor in interest Brian High. Tersely stated, it was Brian Highfs
problem that the Town wished to condemn the water rights—not R.D.'s. Brian High
bears the detriment of a condemnation action—not R.D. Brian High was not justified in
refusing to pay the payments to R.D. when due.
POINT III

THE STATE WATER ENGINEER WAS NOT INVOLVED IN
ANY ADJUDICATIVE CAPACITY BUT MERELY
PROVIDED EVIDENCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE RECORDS
AND INFORMATION

In its brief, Brian High claims that the trial court allowed the State Water
Engineer to determine the water rights issue before the court. This is a complete
mischaracterization of the role the Affidavit of the State Water Engineer filed in the
summary judgment proceedings in the instant case.
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First, it was Brian High's argument to the court that the State Water Engineer
would clarify whether the water was in dispute. Brian High further urged that the State
Water Engineer would be "expert enough to tell us whether the water can properly be
transferred." It was Brian High's proffer of evidence of what the State Water Engineer
would say that precipitated the Affidavit being obtained from the State Water Engineer.
The transcript of the second to the last hearing on the summary judgment motion on
June 5, 1990, is, in pertinent part:
MR. PARK [Brian High]: * * * And that — what I intend to do is just call
somebody [at trial] from the state engineer's office to determine the status
of the water. I also —
THE COURT:
So you're not relying on any representations to Mr.
Nichols at the time of the signing of the contract?
MR. PARK [Brian High]: I don't think Mr. Nichols can testify — I think he
can testify concerning the representations made by Mr. Wade's clients,
but I don't think that he'd be expert enough to determine whether that
water can properly be transferred and used by us. And we wouldn't rely
on him for that.
* * * *

THE COURT:
And you intend to present evidence from the state
engineer that, in fact, those water rights are tied up in litigation? Is that
basically it?
MR. PARK [Brian High]: Basically when the trial is set, it's our intention
to subpoena him and ask him those questions.
MR. PARK [Brian High]: I don't know. The only thing I know is that — is
that the office of the state engineer has not decided that those are not in
dispute. And that's basically where they tell us what we can do with the
type of water. * * * And what the state engineer has said — and it's my
understanding will say — is that this is called Salt Palace [sic] Springs
[sic], and 1104 is the diligence claim number. In his interrogatories, he
says that's in dispute — that water is in dispute. And we think we're
entitled to a trial on the issue to determine whether it's in dispute. And if it
is, we think we're entitled to rescission.72
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At the final hearing on the summary judgment motion on June 19th, counsel for Brian
High stated:
MR. PARK [Brian High]: At the last hearing, I represented to the Court
that there was a dispute concerning the water, and that the only
one that could answer that dispute was the state engineer. And
after Mr. Wade and I talked to the engineer and reviewed what he
would say in his Affidavit, it was my opinion that maybe the Court
would determine that the two acre feet in dispute was not a
substantial breach of this contract; so, I didn't want to
misrepresent anything to the Court, and that's why I don't object to
this reconsideration of the motion for summary judgment.73
Brian High first urges that the State Water Engineer is the answer to the entire dispute
and now he urges the courts not to rely on the State Water Engineer.
Second, the State Water Engineer acted in the capacities of an administrative
record-keeper and an expert witness, not as an adjudicator. The State Water
Engineer was asked to state what amount of water of Diligence Claim 1104 was to be
transferred by the Agreement and what amount of appurtenant water was subject to
the General Adjudication. The State Water Engineer gave that information based on
his administrative records, and his engineering expertise. He did not pretend to act in
any judicial capacity or to issue a decision as to the parties' rights. The Affidavit of the
State Water Engineer was not "res judicata" on the issue of ownership nor did it
attempt to resolve any dispute as to the water included in the Property, regardless of
Brian High's claims to the contrary.
The State Water Engineer stated that there were less than two-acre feet of the
stockwatering rights pertaining to the Property still involved in the General
Adjudication and that in his opinion the stockwatering rights were validly acquired by
diligence use. The State Water Engineer was relying on administrative records in his
office as well as his speaking as an expert when he stated that in his opinion, the
stockwatering rights were valid. Experts are entitled to state their opinions.
73
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Furthermore, the trial court judge did not enter an adjudication of water rights or
quiet title decree based on the information from the State Water Engineer. The judge
simply found, based in part on the State Water Engineer's information, that the lessthan-two-acre-feet of stockwatering rights involved in the General Adjudication did not
preclude summary judgment because that small amount was an immaterial fact, and
that Brian High's default was not justified because the bargained for "appurtenant"
water rights existed.
THE COURT:
All right. I'm going to grant the motion for summary
judgment, it appearing that there's no material issue of fact that
has been raised by the defense — or by the defendants to that
motion for summary judgment. It appears that the — the land was
transferred with appurtenant water rights, and the evidence shows
that appurtenant water rights are available. And there's no
legitimate dispute as to how much those — or the quantity of water
that was involved. * * * *74
POINT IV

IT IS NOT NECESSARY FOR THE COURT TO
DETERMINE THE EXACT AMOUNT OF WATER NOR TO
DO MORE THAN IT HAS DONE

It is not necessary for the trial court to determine the exact quantity of
"appurtenant" water included in the Property nor does the trial court need to quiet title
in any party. As argued herein, the term "appurtenant" identifies R.D.'s clear intent that
R.D. intended to transfer its interest in the water, belonging to and being used in
connection with the land subject to the specific exclusions and reservations. By the
use of the term "appurtenant," R.D. was not attempting to quantify the water being
transferred with the Property. Essentially, as the judge stated in the final hearing, R.D.
promised "appurtenant water" and there was "appurtenant water" available for transfer.
The specific quantity was immaterial.
Furthermore, R.D. has not claimed ownership to any amount of water beyond
that appurtenant water which it intended to transfer under the Agreement. To create a
need for a quiet title action, at least two parties would need to raise conflicting claims
74
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of ownership in the same rights, whether land or property. Brian High is alone in its
claims of conflicting ownership interests.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Appellee requests that the decision of the trial court to
enter summary judgment against Brian High and in favor of R.D. be affirmed.
DATED THIS 73

Y\

day of

WICL^I

, 1991.

SNOW,
JOW, NUFFER, ENGSTROM & DRAKE
A Professional Corporation

TEHRTDWADE
Attorney for Appellee R.D.
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the 26wJL day of

, 1991, I served a

VHCM^

copy of the BRIEF OF APPELLEE on each of the following by depositing four true and
correct copies of the foregoing in the U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, addressed to:
Michael W. Park, Esq.
THE PARK FIRM

2 West St. George Blvd, Suite 32
St. George, Utah 84770

\Ah*L^

TERHY LJA/ADE
Attorney for Appellee R.D.

PAGE 35

